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Estate, (1896)22 actual value to be determined from the best
methods at command was the test adopted. After Stake's
Estate, (1913)23 book value was almost always used, but this
test was repudiated in Thompson's Estate, (1918)24 where the

court said they were interested only in actual value and not
concerned with book value. In view of this uncertainty
Baird's Estate (1930)1 5 at least offers temporary relief. It
was there held that book value is the test. The court said,
"The prima facie standard of measurement of intact value
of trust estates, the income of which is to be paid to a
beneficiary with remainder over, is the book value; and this
standard remains fixed unless it can be established that the
elements making up the book value are not true values".
It is interesting to note the court's reasons for adopting
this as a test as they show the courts are trying where
possible to simplify the rule. It is pointed out that capitalization of income over long periods and the averaging of
values cannot be considered because too uncertain for
definite purposes; and actual appraisment, though sometimes necessary where book value is not available, is often
impossible because of prohibitive costs.
W. H. Dunbar, III

THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
Running through almost every phase of its law, is an
extraordinary protection given to infants in Pennsylvania.
Sometimes, apparently, this protection was unwarranted.
However, until recently it was never questioned that infant
trespassers were in no better position than adults.
Within the past few years our courts, probably inadvertently, have allowed statements to creep into their
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opinions which intimated that we had adopted the doctrine
enunciated by Sioux City v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657, that one
leaving a dangerous machine on his land, likely to attract
and likely to injure children, is liable for injuries to them,
even though they are trespassers. Always such intimation
has been by way of dicta, but the recent case of Colligen v.
Phila. Electric Co., 301 Pa. 87, 151 Ati.699 (Pa. 1930) was
decided entirely on this doctrine, although the decision for
the defendant is compatible with the previous cases not
adopting this theory.
That case was one where the defendant maintained
an electric transformer for the use of the Breyer Ice Cream
Co. on the latter's lot. The apparatus was entirely surrounded by smooth steel walls, nine feet high, but without
a roof. The plaintiff, a child of ten, obtained a ladder and
climbed to the top of the structure, and on reaching it fell
within the enclosure. Recovery was denied on the ground
that this was not an attractive nuisance. This decision,
however, is also sustainable on pure rules of negligence,
which heretofore were the only rules governing this type
of case.
It now becomes very questionable what the courts will
do in a case where the doctrine of Sioux City v. Stout will
apply in favor of the trespasser. Will they treat the Colligen
case as binding only as to its decision and ignore the reasoning, thereby retaining the law in its present form, or will
they, in adopting its reasoning, also adopt a principle of
law, which at best is very doubtful as to its logic.
Until the present time it was admitted without the
shadow of doubt that our law fully recognized the right
of one having dominion of the soil, to do any lawful act
on his premises, without malice, and leave the consequences
of the act on him who has wandered out of his way, though
the wanderer may have been guilty of no negligence.
The fact that the person injured was a child was
deemed immaterial, except that it might relieve him of
the charge of contributory negligence. On the other hand,
the plaintiff's youth did not give rise to any imputation of
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negligence on the part of the defendant.1 The defendant
was not regarded as owing him a duty if he would owe
none to an adult under the same circumstances.'
Although the one hurt was of tender years, it did not
alter his status as a trespasser. 8 To recover he was required to do more than show negligence. It must have appeared that there was a wanton or intentional injury inflicted on
4
him by the owner.
Within recent years, however, expressions have been
allowed by our Supreme Court to creep into cases which
intimate that we have adopted the rule as applied by the
Federal Courts; one which probably has given rise to a
greater divergence of judicial opinion than almost any other
subject within the domain of law.
The first case to throw any doubt on our adherence to
common-law rules of negligence in connection with infant
trespassers was Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332. A
heavy platform had been suspended precariously over a
private alley way, but the passage opened into a public and
much frequented street. Children and often grown persons
went into this alley on many occasions. On one of these
occasions the platform fell, crushing beneath it several
children, who were allowed to recover for their injuries
although they were trespassers. This case, however, may
easily be reconciled with that line of cases holding one
liable for injuries to a trespasser, when one leaves a dangerous appliance on a public street or so near to one, that any
one inadverently walking on it might be injured by such
object." The basis of liability for the above principle is the
negligence of the defendant in leaving a dangerous applilThompson v. B. & O7R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444.
Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475; Conn v. Penna. R. R. Co., 288
Pa. 494; Zamaria v. Davis, 284 Pa. 525; Walsh v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co.,
221 Pa. 463; Saar v. American Glass Specialty Co., 55 Pa. Super. Ct.
2

282.
SHojecki v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 283 Pa. 444.
'Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332.
5Hildebrand v. Director General of Railroads, 270 Pa. 86; Euler
v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 542.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ance where it is reasonably forseeable that it will injure
someone, who is entirely within his rights.
In spite of the fact that the case might be explained
as above, the courts have unequivocally said that it was
decided on peculiar facts, and therefore must be limited to
them.6 The decision has been so explained and qualified by
adjudications of our Supreme Court as to have been probably overruled.?
Only two other cases are in our reports which tend to
bear out Hydraulic Works v. Orr. They are Fitzpatrick v.
Penfield, 267 Pa.564 and Costanzi v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276
Pa.90. Neither of these expressly adopted the rule of Sioux
City v. Stout, but by dicta expressed sentiments in language
which, at first glance, are only compatible with such adoption. But upon inspection we find that even were these expressions of the court not dicta they would have no effect
on the problem under discussion, since the latter case confuses the doctrine of attractive nuisances with the rules
governing land used for a number of years as a playground,
while in the former case the expression "attractive appliance" was used without any logical connection with the
language used before or after.
If the situation were left here, it might appear that
the holding in Colligen v. Phila. Electric Co. was justified as
the first pertinent judicial expression on the question, and
controlling as a precedent although based on an illogical
doctrine. But the situation cannot be left here, since there
is a line of cases, expressly and in clear language, repudiating the federal rule of liability in the case of an infant trespasser and typified by the leading case of Thompson v. B. &
0. R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444.
Sioux City v. Stout was decided solely upon humanitarian sentiment, without any consideration to the property
rights of a landowner or the logic of the holding. The
viciousness of the reasoning which fixes liability on a prop6
Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144; Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475;
Feehan v. Dobson, 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 6.
7
Keegan v. County of Luzerne, 8 Kulp 160.
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erty owner lies in the assumption that what operates as a
temptation to a person of immature mind, is in effect an
invitation. Such an assumption is unwarranted and is not
consistent with any other principle of law, for if a child is
an invitee and he should carry off the attractive article,
he would not be responsible for its conversion, either civilly
or criminally. But it has never been held that such an
implied invitation is a defense to such an act.
In addition the restraint created by the doctrine would
amount to a prohibition upon the mode of beneficial use of
land for the protection of intruders. An owner is not liable
for leaving his land in its natural shape; why should he be
held liable for placing structures upon it, harmless in themselves, and which are necessary for the lawful use he wishes
to make of it? If such a principle should be the law, an
owner could not make full use of his land for fear of injury
to infant trespassers.
To hold otherwise would make everyone responsible
for the negligence of parents except themselves,8 and it
cannot be contended that parents who permit their children
to trespass on the property of another are not guilty of
negligence. 9
In conclusion, it is well to point out that Colligen v.
Phila. Electric Co. did not pretend to be decided on stare
decisis, and cited the general discussion of the problem of
liability to infant trespassers in Corpus Juris as its only
authority. The question, although before this case it might
have been considered closed in this state, becomes an open
one again and one of the utmost importance. Interested
parties, consequently, should watch the next decision on the
matter with the expectation of finding a definite statement
on the matter.
Albert M. Hankin
8Thompson v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444; Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Pa. 144.
9Cauley

v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 95 Pa. 398.

